The Industry Standard - IT vs. initiative: The Internet age comes to the battlefield - Comments

My opinion is that the

gary — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 05:27:45 -0400

My opinion is that the military puts too much emphasis on a perfect record for promotion. There is nothing wrong with making mistakes as long as you (a) learn and (b) don't repeat them.

The "perfect record" requirement makes commanders risk averse, which is the same as making control freaks. Which is how you end up with systems where generals can watch sergeants in the field. And Sergeants should never be watched except by other sergeants or a platoon commander.

Liked the article, will get the book.

You didn't mention the

Mrjag — Tue, 01 Jul 2008 20:10:22 -0400

You didn't mention the PRC-25.....you must have had that radio by then?
Every hear of a TRC-97......
Danang 70-7l
2532
MWCS-1, MWHG-1, 1st MAW

In way simpler words --

Wade Schuette — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 10:36:22 -0400

In way simpler words -- imagine that someone didn't understand the idea of "perspective" and made decisions based on the fact that things actually get smaller when they move far away from you. This is the kind of error the IT system is making - the local situation should have been correctly reduced in size to invisible by the time it got to a General's desk. By leaving it "full screen" in magnitude, he now imagines it must be the size of a mountain to be even visible to him, and feels compelled to respond. The solution is to let the General respond to things he sees, and correctly scale what he sees for him, which is what he's used to. It's not the speed that's the issue - it's the scale correction.

Fascinating -- and

Wade Schuette — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 10:10:39 -0400

Fascinating -- and expectable. In business school in 1975 we studied a case where IBM had discovered this same phenomenon - connecting the top management directly to data at the front lines, and it almost crashed the company before they figured out what was going wrong. I've been pondering that since then.
The current managment literature, by the way, now at last strongly supports the idea that in "complex adaptive systems" the front line people need to be given authority to make decisions. The literature on highly reliable systems supports that. Books like Taking Charge (Perry Smith, 1983) and the US Army Leadership Field Manual (http://newbricks.blogspot.com/2006/12/us-army-leadership-field-manual-fm...) support that. In Katrina, the Coast Guard was most effective because the Captains had the authority to make decisions on their own and indeed, communication with "the top" was effectively broken because no one was answering the phone.
In fact, in any actual large scale crisis, it might be the norm, not the exception, that the people at the top are so preoccupied with huge questions that they cannot take time to answer the phone to deal with smaller questions. This suggests that the entire National Incident Management plan is based on a false premise and, in a crisis, would collapse.
I suspect that the problems are due to two factors - one, information is actually context sensitive and context varies with level in the hierarchy; and two, the shape of information is actually "fractal", meaning that each worm in each "can of worms" is itself, upon inspection, a new can of worms. The details matter and do not "go away" as readily as they do on the powerpoint slides and over-simplifications at each higher setting of the zoom lens as one goes up the hierarchy. People at the top (military or civilian) have absolutely no idea why the people on the bottom have such trouble dealing with obviously simple situations, and conclude people on the bottom are idiots. People on the bottom have no idea what world upper mangement lives in, an conclude all management or high ranking officers are idiots. Nobody grasps that the world visible, and the "right" answer, is a factor of the zoom-setting on the lens being used to view the problem. Everyone has seen cases where a decision in local space or time is good locally, but bad viewed in the longer term or bigger picture, but we refuse to comprehend that answers depend on scale, on the zoom factor, or the length of the ruler used to measure realilty.
Until IT system designers grasps that reality is not "flat" and it is completely wrong to simply "translate" news from the front to the top without correction for scale, this problem will remain and baffle everyone. This enlightenment is not likely in the near future, given historical trends.
At least we have some understanding of the nature of the problem. A sample image on this page http://www.wu.ece.ufl.edu/courses/eel6562f07/project_topics.html near the bottom appears to be "clearly" Albert Einstein when viewed close up, and is equally "clearly" Marilyn Monroe when viewed from afar. These are called "hybrid images" in the literature. Sadly, much of life has this property, and almost every business is being destroyed by having so much vertical height that the view from the top is disconnected entirely from the view from the bottom, and failure to "listen" upwards correctly. They say, as goes GM, so goes the US. Hmm. GM's top execs could not believe that people cared about gas mileage. The carnage is evident. Everyone else in the world except them seemed to know this, and this kind of structural blindness is rampant and astoundingly powerful.
It needs more study before the carnage gets worse.

A fascinating snapshot of

Farrell McGovern — Sun, 29 Jun 2008 12:27:05 -0400

A fascinating snapshot of the current US command structure! Information technology has flattened the hierarchy of command in major corporations as well. It would be an interesting investigation to compare the two, and see if maybe one could teach the other on how to much information, and at what time it should flow, between various levels in a command structure, military or corporate. I would recommend _Powershift_ by Alvin Toffler, which predicts the rise in power of the corporation and the terrorist. It discusses the way power hierarchies were changing, and is very prescient on how IT will change the way things are managed.

As a 19-year old Marine

Bill Donohue — Sat, 28 Jun 2008 17:39:30 -0400

As a 19-year old Marine Radio Operator,(1962-65) I am astounded at the capabilities described here. This is no joke, literally half the time our radio's didn't even work (ANGR-9, PRC-10, PRC 47, PRC 41). Once we were given single side band (PRC 47 and 41) they worked better, but not reliably. One time I was in Vieques, PR when we wanted to test the new SSB gear. We got through to North Carolina, but I couldn't communicate with the next hill.

I concur with most of the comments. It will be impossible for command NOT to interfere with small tactical decisions as they will have the data and feel their ass is on the line if things go wrong (think Haditha).

I'm not sure though if this isn't cultural though. In business we are blackberry obsessed, and I always ask the question, if everyone has to check with everyone, then who is making the decisions, haven't they hired people to make these decisions, and if they have and they still "check in" then we are paying them too much. I guess this is hear to stay, and I would rather have a radio that worked, then none at all.

The reasons the US Military works so well is that we have had a tradition of strong NCO's running most tactical operations. To centralize this on a computer screen, with a Lt. or Captain looking over your shoulder could create the kinds of NCO's that mimic the idiots I see in a Starbucks line looking at their blackberry's.

This is, IMHO, the crux of

deichmans — Sat, 28 Jun 2008 17:37:34 -0400

This is, IMHO, the crux of our current "culture shift". Technology always moves faster than culture, so new norms are created while some try to preserve the "old ways". Eventually the marketplace of ideas kills off the inefficient ones -- though that can take decades....

Ironically, the same ay you posted this article, I posted a similar piece on my 'blog:

http://oz.deichman.net/2008/06/on-information.html

My ideas too come from years of service with the Corps (albeit from the civilian side of the fence :-).

Semper Fidelis.

"I never did pass on

richard childers — Sat, 28 Jun 2008 02:17:28 -0400

"I never did pass on headquarters' harangue to the patrol leader. It seemed to me best not to."

Unfortunately, what the Captain describes in the military theater is all too common in the civilian theater of operations - that is, the corporation.

What the Captain did is excellent management. It is what I look for in my own management, and what I offer to those whom report to me - I provide, or am provided with, an umbrella, that keeps the sh*t off of those whom are getting the work done.

Unfortunately, working in Silicon Valley, I have seen engineers in management replaced by MBAs, until dot-coms' entire managerial hierarchy contained not a single engineer, and the entire company's weight rested upon a thin veneer of engineers that actually did most of the work, created most of the income, but received the least in terms of money.

I suspect that the same is true in the military. Those with a keen sense of politics and a willingness to give most of their thought to what is best for their superiors' wellbeing, are promoted. All others are - for one reason or another - eventually replaced.

The problem, you see, is that uppermost management does not look kindly upon those whom fail to place upper management's wellbeing ahead of the wellbeing of those below. These 'superiors' do not forget.

This is probably what the Captain encountered, that led him to resign from the USMC, after twelve years - his career was sabotaged by his superiors and he was denied promotions that he deserved, as a result of insisting on putting his men first - and not lying about his priorities, to anyone.

He will not encounter anything different when he is reporting to Captains of Commerce, back in these United States.

Tactical email response is

Ed — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 22:53:59 -0400

Tactical email response is to keep large chunks of boilerplate text at hand to embed real answers in. A 30 page response to confirm "unknown" will slow the PHBs and allow you to tend to important issues. The boilerplate should be respectful and devoid of actual content or context and not reused too frequently.

Was any consideration given to the "well timed" loss of radio contact? Someone should have suspected localized jamming if it happened again.

As a rule, blogging or IM among cohorts should be read-only by higher levels of management - otherwise that well of knowledge will be poisoned.

>a commander may be dismayed

Rich Hudson — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 21:07:46 -0400

>a commander may be dismayed to find his soldiers have become too heavily reliant on headquarters for
>critical decisions. That's dangerous, because sooner or later headquarters won't be available.

Sounds like it could have similar consequences to WWII Germany's "Führer principle," in which battlefield commanders who had temporarily lost contact with higher-ups hesitated to take the initiative and so lost a critical opportunity to our side.

Everyone: Thanks for all of

Ian Lamont — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 14:46:00 -0400

Everyone: Thanks for all of the thoughtful comments. Tyler is aware of them. There is additional discussion about this article taking place on Slashdot ("A Marine's-Eye View of the Networked Battlefield") and Wired's Danger Room blog ("Micro-Managing the War by E-mail").

You may also be interested in reading Tyler's well-written blog, Deeper Than War, where he writes about his experiences in the Marine Corps and talks about future projects -- including his upcoming book and his pending trip to Jordan to aid Iraqi refugees.

Ian Lamont
Managing Editor
The Industry Standard

Very well written, and

Jimmy Callahan — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 13:08:45 -0400

Very well written, and universally true in civilian and military life. Fortunately for me, when my boss is 2nd guessing me, nobody dies. I enjoy your blog and look forward to the book.

Semper Fi

Outstanding article!!!!! The

John L. Estrada — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 12:52:09 -0400

Outstanding article!!!!! The right call was made by the patrol leader with the information he had available to him at the time, it is always easy for those not on the scene to second guest someone else decision. I applaud the Commander for how he handled the questioning from higher headquarters concerning the chain of events. He makes a valid point with his concerns, senior Commanders must be very careful in not using this new technology in a way to stifle the initiative of their Soldiers and Marines engaged in battle. They need to resist the urge to micro-manage and instead, heavily invest in the training of decision making processes of the men and women who will be faced with an array of situations on the battlefield having strategic military and political implications.

Can you let us know the name

kc — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 09:09:21 -0400

Can you let us know the name of the book ? Patton's memoirs. I search on Amazon couldnt find the exact book.

it was obvious these people

corky — Fri, 27 Jun 2008 06:14:51 -0400

it was obvious these people were terrorists, why didn't the patrol shoot them as soon as they saw them?

IT vs. initiative: The Internet age comes to the battlefield

Tyler Boudreau — Wed, 25 Jun 2008 16:19:52 -0400

On a late summer night of 2004 in al Anbar province, Iraq, just south of Abu Ghraib, an observation post (OP) of four Marines was shot at briefly from the shadows. The Marines made out two silhouettes in the distance, returned fire, and pursued them into the darkness. One of the Marines said to the others as they searched the area, "I think I got one!" But no sign of them was found. Moments later, in a small tent several miles away, I read their report on my computer delivered by email.

Fifteen minutes after that, another report came in over the radio from a different Marine foot patrol in the vicinity. They'd stopped a vehicle and found two men inside; one of them had a gunshot wound to the shoulder. The driver told the Marine patrol leader that his friend had been caught in the crossfire of a civil dispute run amok. He was rushing him to the hospital.

It was a likely enough scenario -- we routinely saw the results of these sorts of incidents -- but the patrol leader quickly called me to be sure. "This guy is bleeding pretty bad," he said. "You want me to let them go? Or do you want to send us a Medevac?" He didn't know about the OP engagement that had taken place less than a mile away.

"Tell him to hold on to them," I said to my radio operator. "I'll have a helicopter there in five minutes." As I spoke, I began generating my own report on my laptop to send up to headquarters.

The entire chain of command knew what was happening even before it was over.

This is the nature of the modern battlefield.

I joined the Marine Corps when I was eighteen. That was in 1989, when the great Soviet armored divisions were still considered our primary threat, Communism was still the prevailing ideology to fear, and infantrymen ("grunts" or "ground-pounders" as we're often called) never ever touched computers.

How times have changed. Modern warfare is predominantly made up of decentralized small-unit actions and low-intensity skirmishes in complex "semi-permissive" settings. Today's adversaries are not assembled into the ponderous formations of yesteryear with static defenses and unwieldy supply lines. The prototypical "enemy" of the twenty-first century is an urban guerilla who is mobile, adaptive, and draws his strength and resources primarily from the indigenous population. The prototypical soldier needs more than a rifle to deal with him. He requires a different skill set, and needs speedy communications.

Coming from an older generation of infantrymen, I was astonished to see my unit suddenly being outfitted with every variety of electronic equipment, from "ruggedized" laptop computers with Internet access and instant messaging, to man-packed tracking systems, to a plethora of cameras, videos, and other imagery devices. These innovations were introduced to the battlefield in hopes of increasing situational awareness, rapidly gathering data, analyzing it, organizing it, then pushing it back out to operators as actionable intelligence. They also provide commanders with the freshest possible information and aid them in their moment-to-moment decision-making.

But with the diffuse and often dynamic nature of today's battlefield, the military discovered it needed not only a new line of electronic gadgets, but a new breed of soldier as well -- a thinking soldier.

Commanders can no longer grab their men by the collars of their flak jackets and direct them toward an objective, because in most cases their men are out of reach and the objective is not a point on the map. They depend on their small-unit leaders, who contend with an infinite assortment of situations and variables, to understand the mission, evaluate the circumstances carefully, and exercise initiative in the absence of orders. The military's training has undergone painstaking changes over the past decade to produce exactly this kind of soldier.

Unfortunately, high-speed communications and bold initiative do not always go hand in hand. With such an abundance of information available simultaneously at all levels, micromanagement can creep unnoticed into the chain of command and pull it apart. For example, if a general is able to follow an ongoing firefight through email and IM, and he is inclined to believe he knows what's best for the units in contact, then he very well might start directing those small units from afar, consequently eliminating the need for his colonels, captains, and sergeants to do any thinking of their own.

I witnessed this firsthand in al Anbar. The incidents I described earlier were not so tidily wrapped up, as I'd first assumed. Just as I was explaining my request for a medevac to headquarters, my radio operator informed me that we'd lost contact with our patrol before we could tell them about the OP shooting or get their location for the helicopter. We tried to reestablish comms for twenty minutes, but to no avail. When we finally did reach them, the patrol leader had already made the command decision to let the car go on its way.

Headquarters was furious. It seemed to me that the patrol leader made the humane call given the information available to him; furthermore, we had no actual evidence connecting the two men in the car with the shooting, so I figured we ought to just put the whole thing behind us. But headquarters had no intention of dropping it that easily.

It was as though the whole war was suddenly lost and they had nothing better to do than wring their hands and wonder desperately how the hell we'd ever let those men go. For the next several hours, I was bombarded with emails from headquarters demanding answers. Every question was preceded with the ominous phrase: "The General wants to know . . ."

"Why did they let them go?"

"I've already told you why," I muttered to myself irritably. Then I replied on my computer via email, "Because they didn't know about the OP shooting."

"Why didn't they ask?"

They did ask! I thought as I wrote back, "They did ask. We just didn't answer back in time."

"Why didn't they wait?"

"Because the man was bleeding to death."

"What was the caliber of the gunshot wound?" (They actually asked.)

No idea. I don't think they broke out their tape measures or ripped off the man's bandages. Then I typed angrily, "Unknown."

"How much blood was lost?"

"A lot."

"Why didn't they evacuate the men themselves?"

"Because they were on foot."

"Why didn't they pursue them once you re-established comms?"

"Because they were on foot."

"Which hospital were they going to?"

"Unknown."

"Why didn't they ask?"

"Unknown."

"Why didn't they check out the hospitals and medical clinics in the area? Why didn't they try to find them? Why didn't they do more to get them back? Why did they let them go in the first place?"

By the following morning my head was popping with ire. A million rebukes came to mind. I don't know, I wanted to shout back. Unknown, all right? Because they were on foot, okay? Because they were stupid. Because they were decent human beings. Because they weren't mired in cynicism.

Because they erred on the side of humanity. It was a big fat mistake. They made a call. We can't reverse it. It's over—a shot down-range. We can't get them back. The horse is dead already. Let's just take this opportunity to assume the best. The men were innocent. The patrol leader did the right thing. He saved a life. And let's congratulate him.

But headquarters did not share my optimism and continued its electronic inquiry for two more days until it finally got bored of my increasingly sarcastic responses and stopped writing.

While digital networks have the ability to send, receive, and store infinite amounts of data, there is a natural limit to how much of it any headquarters staff, no matter how robust, can process.

Furthermore, there is a limit to how much a soldier on the ground can convey with the pressures of time, heat, exhaustion, and possibly enemy fire bearing down. Ultimately, the potential of the network falls greatly to the capacity of its end-users. Consequently, any tactical picture formed in remote command posts can't help but obscure the nuances of the peculiar scenarios that patrolling soldiers face on the ground.

The situation is further complicated by the intense political climate of the contemporary battlefield, in which nearly every interaction a soldier has with the local populace, violent or otherwise, can have global repercussions. In such a delicate atmosphere, commanders may grow reluctant to allow their small-unit leaders the freedom to make their own decisions. With the wide array of new communications assets at their fingertips, commanders can easily develop a habit of micromanaging their troops from afar. Given their inherently limited tactical picture, that is a slippery slope at best.

Even if it is successfully climbed, a commander may be dismayed to find his soldiers have become too heavily reliant on headquarters for critical decisions. That's dangerous, because sooner or later headquarters won't be available. Equipment will break; signals will be lost; communications will go down, and almost certainly at the worst times. That's when the commander will wish most that he had cultivated his men's initiative rather than tamped it out through incessant electronic directives or rebukes for mistaken decisions.

I never did pass on headquarters' harangue to the patrol leader. It seemed to me best not to. The conflicting demands of a commander's need for an independent-minded, mission-oriented soldier and his voracious appetite for information cannot be reconciled by technology. It's a human issue and a leadership issue. Computers will undoubtedly continue to improve and be employed on the battlefield in new and amazing ways; the hardest question for commanders may turn out to be when to shut them off.

Tyler Boudreau served 12 years of active service in the Marine Corps infantry, attaining the rank of captain before resigning in 2005. Boudreau's book about his career in the Marines and experiences in Iraq, Packing Inferno, will be published by Feral House in September. His blog, Deeper Than War, is located at www.deeperthanwars.blogspot.com.

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